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Article: 
Most compatibilists have sought to defend their view by means of an analysis of the concept of 'can' in terms of 
subjunctive conditionals.
1
 Keith Lehrer opposes this analysis;
2
 he nevertheless embraces compatibilism.
3
 In a 
recent paper he has proposed a novel analysis of the concept of 'can' within the framework of possible-world 
semantics.
4
 The paper has provoked considerable discussion.
5
 In it Lehrer claims that he demonstrates the truth 
of compatibilism (p. 241).
6
 Others have claimed that this is not so,
7
 but at least one commentator has asserted 
that Lehrer's analysis strongly supports compatibilism.
8
 In this section I shall give a brief exposition of relevant 
portions of Lehrer's account of 'can' and then in the next section I shall seek to show that it fails to render 
compatibilism any more plausible than incompatibilism. Indeed, I shall seek to show that, if one of Lehrer's 
primitive concepts (the concept of an 'advantage') is understood as it seems it should be understood, then there 
would seem to be good reason to believe that his analysis supports not compatibilism but incompatibilism. 
 
There are many aspects of Lehrer's account of 'can' that cannot be covered in this section, but here are the 
relevant highlights.
9
 To set the stage of his inquiry, Lehrer gives an account of what it is for an action to be 
ancestrally determined (pp. 244-5). He says, first of all, that (where 'W' names the actual world) a condition C 
occurring at a time ti in w determines that a condition C* occur at a time tn in W just in case (i) ti is earlier than 
tn, (ii) there is some possible world w in which C occurs at ti but C* does not occur at tn, but (iii) in every 
possible world w that has the same laws as W and where C occurs at ti, C* does occur at tn. He then says that a 
person S's doing an action A at tn in W is ancestrally determined just in case (i) for some time ti and some 
condition C, C occurring at ti in W determines that S do A at tn in W, and (ii) for every time ti and every 
condition C, if C occurring at ti in W determines that S do A at tn in W, then, for some time th and some 
condition C*, C* occurring at th in W determines that C occur at ti in W. And so it is Lehrer's aim to show that 
its being ancestrally determined that S not do A at tn in W does not imply that there is no time ti such that S can 
at ti do A at tn in W; that is, to put it more simply but less precisely, it is Lehrer's aim to show that it is possible 
that a person can perform an action even though his not doing so is ancestrally determined. 
 
Lehrer notes (p. 254) that it follows neither merely from the fact that there is some possible world w in which S 
does A at tn, nor merely from the fact that there is some possible world w with the same laws as W and in which 
S does A at tn, that there is a time ti such that S can at ti do A at tn in W. Some restriction is required, and, as a 
first step, Lehrer calls upon Pollock's concept of minimal difference (pp. 245-8).
10
 Pollock analyzes a statement 
of the form 
 
(1) If C were to occur at ti, then S would do A at tn  
 
by means of a statement of the form 
 





In pursuing his account of 'can' Lehrer invokes the concept of minimal difference by talking of the need to find 
a possible world which is 'minimally changed to accommodate' S's doing A at tn. A slightly odd feature of such 
talk (given (1a)) is the absence of any mention of a condition with respect to which the possible world in 
question is supposed to be changed to 'accommodate' S's doing A at tn. At any rate, when indulging in such talk, 
Lehrer in fact appears implicitly to rely on the following: 
 
(2) At ti world w accommodates, with respect to world w*, S doing A at tn if and only if there is a condition C 
such that: 
 
(i) ti is not later than tn; 
 
(ii) w is minimally different from w* with respect to C's occurring at ti; and 
 
(iii) S does A at tn in w. 
 
Lehrer also makes the assumption that for every world w, every world w*, every condition C, and every time ti, 
if w is minimally different from w* with respect to C's occurring at ti, then w has the same laws as w*. He then 
considers the following proposal (p. 254): 
 
(3a) S can at ti do A at tn in W if and only if there is a world w such that at ti w accommodates, with respect to 
W, S doing A at tn. 
 
But (3a) is too liberal. As Lehrer remarks (p. 254), it may be, for example, that I cannot move from a wall, 
despite being anxious to do so, because I am chained to it; and yet we can find a possible world w which is 
minimally changed to accommodate my moving. Indeed, it seems that any world which is minimally different 
from W with respect to my being chained would satisfy what is required of w. But any such world is too 
different from W; for in it I enjoy an advantage that I lack in W, namely, the advantage of being unchained, and 
it seems to be this fact which renders (3a) too liberal as an account of 'can.' So Lehrer considers the following 
proposal (p. 255): 
 
(3b) S can at ti do A at tn in W if and only if there is a world w such that: 
 
(i) at ti w accommodates, with respect to W, S doing A at tn; and 
 
(ii) S has no advantage at ti in w for doing A at tn that he lacks at ti in W. 
 
But (3b) is still too liberal, since it may be the case that I have the advantages I need at ti to do A at tn, but that 
something occurs after ti but before tn to prevent me from doing A at tn. However, to modify (3b) by substituting 
In' for each occurrence of „tn‟ in clause (ii) would make the analysis too restrictive, since some advantages a 
person acquires after ti are ones that he may acquire simply as a result of what he does after ti, and it seems that 
these advantages should not be ruled out. As Lehrer remarks (p. 256), if at ti I stay at home rather than go to the 
airport, it does not follow that I cannot at ti catch a flight at tn to Washington, even though in a world where I do 
go to the airport I have an advantage at tn that I lack in W, namely, the advantage of being in the airport. 
 
These considerations lead Lehrer to the conclusion that a distinction between types of advantages is called for; 
some will be admissible and some not. Lehrer provides a detailed, recursive definition of 'admissibility in this 
context which amounts roughly to the following (pp. 256-7): an advantage is admissible for S (even though S in 
fact lacks it) as long as, had S initiated a course of action which he in fact did not initiate, he would have 
secured this advantage for himself, and the initiation itself would have required no advantage that S lacked. 
Given this notion of admissibility, Lehrer is finally in a position to propose his own analysis of the concept of 
'can.' It is this (p. 256): 
 
(3c) S can at ti do A at tn in W if and only if there is a world w such that: 
(i) at ti w accommodates, with respect to W, S doing A at tn; and 
 
(ii) for every time tj not earlier than ti and not later than tn and for every advantage v for doing A at tn, if S 
has v at tj in w and lacks v at tj in W, then v is admissible for S from W. 
 
In Lehrer's own words, what (3c) amounts to is roughly this (p. 257): 
 
The intuitive idea captured by our analysis is that a person could (at ti) have done A at tn just in case 
there is a possible world or scenario beginning at ti in which what the person does culminates in his 
doing A at tn. It is crucial that at ti and subsequently to tn he not have any advantages in the scenario for 
doing A at tn which he, in fact, lacks, except those that result from what he does earlier, though not prior 
to ti. 
 
Lehrer's main contention, given (3c), is of course that its being ancestrally determined that S not do A at tn in W 
is compatible with the possibility that, for some time ti, S can at ti do A at tn in W. Now, it is certainly true that 
any such incompatibility is not formally deducible from (3c) without the aid of some axioms concerning the 
concept of an advantage. But it is Lehrer's contention that the provision of any such axioms is quite 
unwarranted. To support this contention he says the following (p. 266): 
 
I can find no reason whatever for supposing that a condition that determines my not performing some 
action, even a condition that existed before I was born, should have the result that at every subsequent 
time I lack some advantage I needed to perform the action. To be sure, if I have the required advantages, 
I shall not use them because, by hypothesis, I do not perform the action. But the determination might 
explain why I do not make use of the advantages I have ... and, therefore, not entail that I lacked some 
advantage needed to perform the action. It is my contention that many human actions are to be explained 
in just this way. 
 
II 
Lehrer's account of 'can' is original, far-reaching, and complex. For all these reasons it deserves careful 
consideration. Now, the foregoing exposition of this account is incomplete in many respects, but it should 




I have no quarrel with Lehrer's characterization of the concepts of one condition's determining another and of 
one condition's ancestrally determining another. Moreover, Lehrer is obviously right to dismiss the suggestion 
that there being a possible world in which S does A at tn implies that S can (at ti) do A at tn in W; so too with the 
suggestion that there being a possible world with the same laws as W and in which S does A at tn has this 
implication. My first difficulty with Lehrer's account arises with his invocation of the concept of minimal 
difference. Certainly the two suggestions just mentioned are too liberal, and certainly (3a) is more restrictive 
than either of them. But, as Lehrer himself points out, (3a) still requires restriction. The restriction that Lehrer 
imposes concerns the concept of an advantage, and once this concept has been invoked, there would seem to be 
little need to make use also of the concept of minimal difference. In my opinion, (3b) and (3c) could both be 
harmlessly simplified by striking clause (i) of each.
13
 Perhaps Lehrer would demur. Perhaps he would say that it 
is possible that there be a possible world which at no time accommodates, with respect to W, S doing A at tn and 
yet in which S does A at tn with no, or at least admissible, advantage; and perhaps Lehrer would say that there 
being such a world does not imply that S can at some time ti do A at tn in W. I do not know, and my ignorance is 
partly due to the fact that I am unclear as to just what constitutes a minimal change and what does not. 
 
More important than coming to grips with the concept of minimal difference, however, is coming to grips with 
the concept of an advantage; for it is this concept that lies at the heart of Lehrer's analysis. It has already been 
noted that, without the provision of certain axioms concerning this concept, the following implication is not 
formally deducible from (3c) (or from anything that leads up to it): 
 
(4) If it is ancestrally determined that S not do A at tn in W, then there is no time ti such that S can at ti do A at tn 
in W. 
 
But it should also be noted that the negation of (4) is also not formally deducible from (3c) (or from anything 
that leads up to it). This fact in itself undermines Lehrer's contention that he has demonstrated the truth of 
compatibilism. For note that it is open to one to accept Lehrer's account of 'can' and yet to insist that 
incompatibilism is true. One may do this simply by claiming that, if S not doing A at tn in W is causally 
necessitated, any world in which S does A at tn (and hence in which S not doing A at tn is not causally 
necessitated) is one where S enjoys an enormous and inadmissible advantage for doing A at tn, to wit, the 
advantge of its not being causally required that he not do A at tn.
14
 Now Lehrer certainly says (see the quotation 
which completes my exposition of his account) that he finds no reason to accept this incompatibilist claim, but I 
in turn find no reason not to accept it. For it seems to me that this move is open to the incompatibilist unless and 
until an account of the concept of an advantage is given which rules the move out. 
 
The main point to be made here is, of course, that the tenability of Lehrer's version of compatibilism is 
contingent upon an adequate account of the concept of an advantage. But Lehrer provides no such account. It is 
reasonable, however, to interpret some of his remarks (pp. 254-7) so that he is seen to have roughly the 
following account of the concept of an advantage in mind: 
 
(5) S has at ti in w an advantage for doing A at tn that he lacks at ti in w* if and only if either 
 
(i) S has at ti in w a better opportunity to do A at tn than he has at ti in w*, or 
 
(ii) S has at ti in w a better ability to do A at tn than he has at ti in w*. 
 
Now, I stress that Lehrer does not explicitly endorse (5) — to repeat, it is the lack of any such explicit 
characterization of the concept of an advantage which constitutes one of the main problems with his paper —
but, given that it appears reasonable to ascribe it to him, the question to which we should now address ourselves 
is this. Does Lehrer's account of 'can' imply the truth of compatibilism when the concept of an advantage is 
understood as it is in (5)? 
 
In an interesting comment on Lehrer's paper, Terence Horgan makes certain remarks which strongly suggest the 
following argument.
15
 It would seem that 
 
(6) S can at ti do A at tn in W  
 
is equivalent to 
 




If we construct the inelegant neologism 'canning' from the verb 'can,' we may infer from the equivalence of (6) 
and (6a) the following: 
 
(7) The concept S canning at ti do A at tn in W is identical with the concept S having at ti both the ability and the 
opportunity to do A at tn in W. 
 
But since, according to (5), 
 
(8) The concept of an advantage is to be understood in terms of the concepts of ability and opportunity, 
 
we may conclude 
 
(9) Lehrer's analysis of the concept of 'can' is conceptually circular. 
 
Whether or not the foregoing argument is correctly ascribed to Horgan, I think we can fairly easily see that it is 
inconclusive.
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 For, first of all, it is not at all clear that one proposition's being equivalent (that is, strictly 
equivalent) to another implies that the concepts constructed from them in the manner of (7) are identical. For a 
criterion of identity for concepts would first have to be agreed upon. Secondly, evert granting that (7) is true, it 
is not clear that (9) follows from (7) and (8). It would seem at least that (8) should be strengthened to read as 
follows: 
 
(8a) The concept of an advantage is to be understood only in terms of the concepts of ability and opportunity, 
 
and even then it is not clear that (9) would follow. 
 
I do not think, therefore, that Lehrer's account of 'can' is properly accused of suffering from conceptual 
circularity, even when it is extended by the explicit addition of (5). But other objections may be raised against 
it, and on various levels. Consider the following argument: 
 
Argument A: (1) It is ancestrally determined that S not do A at tn in W. 
 
Therefore (2)There are a condition (call it C) and a time (call it ti) such that C occurring at ti in W determines 
that S not do A at tn in W. 
 
Therefore (3)C occurs at ti in W, 
 
and (4) For every world w, if w has the same laws as W and C occurs at ti in w, then S does not do A at tn in 
w. 
 
(5) For every time tj, if S can at tj do A at tn in W, then there is a world w such that (a) w has the same 
laws as W, (b) for every event B and every time ti not later than tj, if B occurs at ti in W then B occurs at 
ti in w, and (c) S does A at tn in w. 
 
Therefore (6) S cannot at ti do A at tn in W. 
 
Therefore (7) If it is ancestrally determined that S not do A at tn in W, then there is no time ti such that S can at 
ti do A at tn in W. 
 
Argument A constitutes an attack on Lehrer's account without making mention of the concept of an advantage. 
In order to block the conclusion, Lehrer must deny the truth of the fifth line of the argument. This denial strikes 
me as highly unintuitive. What such a denial amounts to is roughly the following: it is possible that 'S can at ti 
do A at tn in W' be true even though there is no world w having the same laws as W (and this includes W, of 
course) in which S's past history up to and including ti is as it in fact is (i.e., as it is in W) and in which S does A 
at tn. Or in other, even rougher, words: it is possible that S can at ti do A at tn even though his actually doing A 
at tn requires that the past (that is, the world's history prior to ti) be altered, i.e., requires that an indefinite 
number of events, which in fact did occur prior to ti, never occurred. 
 
I think Argument A spells trouble for Lehrer. If we now invoke the concept of an opportunity, we may produce 
a short argument which, in my opinion, spells trouble for any compatibilist. Consider the following principle: 
 
(P1) If it is ancestrally determined that S not do A at tn in W, then there is no time ti such that S has at ti in W 
an opportunity to do A at tn. 
 
(P1) seems to me to be true. Lehrer might not agree, but nothing in his paper implies that it is false. Now 
consider the following argument: 
 




Therefore (3) If it is ancestrally determined that S not do A at tn in W, then there is no time ti such that S can at 
ti do A at tn in W. 
 
Both premises seem true to me. I think that we may construe certain of Lehrer's remarks (p. 242) as an 
endorsement of the first premise of Argument B so that, if he were confronted with this argument, he would 




If neither Argument A nor Argument B is sufficiently troubling to Lehrer, it may yet be pointed out, in answer 
to our principal question as to whether or not Lehrer's account of 'can' implies the truth of compatibilism when 
the concept of an advantage is understood as it is in (5), that it can be shown that it is open to the incompatibilist 
to accept Lehrer's account insofar as it is constituted by (3c) (and what leads up to it) together with the account 
of the concept of an advantage that is provided by (5). In order for this to be demonstrated, (P1) and also some 
further principles must be invoked. The other principles are: 
 
(P2) If there is no time ti such that S has at ti in W an opportunity to do A at tn, then, for every world w and 
every time tj, if S has at tj in w an opportunity to do A at tn, then this opportunity is inadmissible for S from 
W. 
 
(P3) For every world w, every opportunity o, and every time ti, if S has o at ti in w and o is inadmissible for 
S from W, then there is an advantage v such that S has v at ti in w and v is inadmissible for S from W. 
 
(P4) For every world w, if S does A at tn in w, then there is a time ti such that S has at ti in w an opportunity 
to do A at tn. 
 
Each of these principles is perhaps more controversial than its successor, but each seems reasonable to me. (P2) 
of course relies on the concept of admissibility with regard to opportunities. I shall not provide an analysis of 
this concept here; I expect that it would be possible to give some recursive analysis akin to that given by Lehrer 
for the concept of admissibility with regard to advantages. The plausibility of (P2) rests on the observation that 
at no time does S have in W an opportunity to do A at tn; hence it would seem that, if in some world w he does 
at some time have such an opportunity, the opportunity must arise from some prior action of his in w for which 
he has some advantage inadmissible for him from W. This reasoning, is, of course, not conclusive, and (P2) is 
perhaps the most questionable principle of the four principles invoked here. (P3), given a proper understanding 
of the admissibility of opportunities, would seem to follow directly from (5). But I shall not attempt to show 
this, and so I include it as a new principle. Finally, (P4) seems to be obviously true. 
 
With the aid of (P1) through (P4) and Lehrer's account of 'can' (namely, that contained in (3c)) I shall now 
derive that proposition which serves as a conclusion to both Argument A and Argument B, i.e., I shall now 
derive (4). 
 




Therefore (3) There is no time ti such that S has at ti in W an opportunity to do A at tn. 
 
(4) (P2) 
Therefore (5) For every world w and every time ti, if S has at ti in w an opportunity to do A at tn, then this 




Therefore (7) For every world w and every time ti, if S has at ti in w an opportunity to do A at tn, then S has at 




Therefore (9) For every world w, if S does A at tn in w, then there is a time ti such that S has at ti in w an 




Therefore (11) For every time ti, if S can at ti do A at tn in W, then there is a world w in which S does A at tn 
and in which S does not have at ti an advantage for doing A at tn which is inadmissible for S from W. 
 
Therefore (12) There is no time ti such that S can at ti do A at tn in W. 
 
Therefore (13) If it is ancestrally determined than S not do A at tn in W, then there is no time ti such that S can 
at ti do A at tn in W. 
 
I think that the strength of Argument C lies in the fact that none of (P1) through (P4) is as strong a principle as 
those expressed in the fifth line of argument A and in the first line of Argument B. This being so, any claim by a 
proponent of compatibilism that Argument C in some manner 'begs the question' is even less warranted than 
such a claim would be when made with regard to Argument A or Argument B. I can imagine, however, that 
Lehrer would wish to dispute not only (P1) but also (P2), though, again, I do not know on what grounds he 
would do so. But this fact, if it is a fact, is not so important as the fact that nothing in Lehrer's paper serves to 
rule out any of (P1) through (P4). This being the case, and given that (4) is provable from them and (3c), it is 
certainly not true that Lehrer's analysis of the concept of 'can' implies the truth of or even strongly supports 
compatibilism, even when the key concept of an advantage is understood as it seems it should be (i.e., as it is in 
(5)). His analysis fails to render compatibilism any more plausible than incompatibilism. Indeed, if, as I believe, 






1 The type of 'can' at issue here is that which features in such sentences as 'Smith can run a four-minute 
mile,"Jones can recite the Greek alphabet backwards,' and so on, when these are understood in the most natural 
manner and understood to imply that there is nothing preventing the agent from performing the action in 
question. I shall not elaborate on this here; the matter should be familiar enough. Among the most prominent 
proponents of the conditional analysis of this concept of 'can' are Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Jonathan Edwards, 
Mill, Moore, Schlick, Stevenson, Ayer, and P.H. Nowell-Smith. 
2 Keith Lehrer, 'An Empirical Disproof of Determinism?', in Keith Lehrer, ed., Freedom and Determinism 
(New York: Random House 1966) 195-7; and "Can" in Theory and Practice: A Possible Worlds Analysis,' in 
Myles Brand and Douglas Walton, eds., Action Theory (Dordrecht, Holland/Boston, U.S.A.: D. Reidel 
Publishing Company 1976) 248-50. Henceforth I shall refer to the latter article as 'CTP.' 
3 I take compatibilism to be the doctrine that it is logically possible that determinism be true and free action yet 
occur; incompatibilism is the denial of this possibility. The link between 'S freely does A' and 'S can do A' is 
one that I shall not explore here, except to say that the truth of the former implies the truth of the latter. 
4 Lehrer, CTP. 
5 Terence Horgan, 'Lehrer on "Could"-Statements,' Philosophical Studies, 32 (1977) (henceforth I shall refer to 
this article as 'LCS'); Robert Audi, 'Avoidability and Possible Worlds,' Philosophical Studies, 33 (1978) 
(henceforth I shall refer to this article as 'APW'). 
6 All such page-references will be to the text of CTP. 
7 Horgan, LCS, 409; Audi, APW, 419. 
8 Audi, APW, 419. 
9 The account that follows is not only an abbreviated, but also a somewhat reconstructed, version of the 
original. The reconstruction is undertaken out of a desire for uniformity both of exposition and of evaluation. I 
believe that no distortion of Lehrer's position results from it; indeed, his position is somewhat clarified because 
of it. 
10 John L. Pollock, Subjunctive Reasoning (Dordrecht, Holland/Boston, U.S.A.: D. Reidel Publishing 
Company 1976). 
11 This is putting the matter only in rough form. Pollock in fact distinguishes between many kinds of 
subjunctive conditionals. 
12 For example, I shall ignore remarks made by Lehrer to the effect that an event may be ancestrally determined 
even though none of its causes occurs more than ten minutes before it does. 
13 Audi (APW, 414) also suggests that the concept of minimal difference is dispensable. 
14 Horgan gives this argument (LCS, 409-10). 
15 Horgan, LCS, 407-9. 
16 Horgan obviously relies at this point on P.H. Nowell-Smith's analysis of the concept of 'can,' as presented in 
the latter's Ethics (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books 1954) Chapter XIX. But it should be noted that, 
despite its other problems which I discuss immediately below, the present argument is further undermined by 
the fact that Lehrer explicitly rejects (CTP, 242) Nowell-Smith's analysis. 
17 Audi concurs (APW, 418). 
18 Perhaps the grounds are to be found somewhere in his remarks on p. 266 of CTP, but I am not sure of this. 
19 I am grateful to Fred Feldman, and also to referees of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy, for valuable 
advice on an earlier draft of this paper. 
